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Maker: The Essex Regiment and Operation Atlantic

The Essex Scottish Regiment
in Operation Atlantic
What went wrong?
John Maker

A

lmost two years after its nearannihilation at Dieppe, the Essex
Scottish Regiment returned to battle
on 20 July 1944 at Verrières Ridge and
was decimated for a second time. It
had orders to seize an objective under
hopeless conditions, lacked adequate
support, and had an inexperienced
brigadier, Hugh A. Young. What
went wrong?
The commanding officer (CO),
Lieutenant-Colonel B.J.S. MacDonald,
could not convince his superior officer
and the battalion’s supporting armour
to intervene at a crucial juncture.
Young’s failure to intervene cost the
Essex Scots their reputation and selfconfidence, their popular CO, and
244 of their men – dead, wounded,
or missing. Second Canadian Corps
lost an important position astride the
strategic high ground south of Caen,
and the Black Watch, which sought
to restore the situation, suffered
many casualties. The heavy losses at
Verrières Ridge helped to give the
Essex Scots the dubious distinction
of suffering the most casualties of
any Canadian regiment during the
war. It is unlikely that any member
of the regiment (or any other unit)
could have saved the day, and the
shabby treatment that MacDonald

Abstract: On 20-21 July 1944 the 6th
Canadian Infantry Brigade was engaged in
combat operations on Verrières Ridge south
of Caen. Enemy resistance was stronger
than expected and the Canadian attack
was met by strong German counterattacks
supported by armour. During the course of
the battle, two units, the Essex Scottish
Regiment and the South Saskatchewan
Regiment were driven back. In the
aftermath of the battle the Essex Scottish
Regiment and their commanding officer
were criticized for their poor performance.
This article examines the battle in an
attempt to understand who was to blame.
Lieutentant-Colonel B.J.S MacDonald, the
commanding officer of the Essex Scots,
was fired for his role in the battle, but this
article posits that Brigadier Hugh A. Young
bears the greater share of responsibility for
the operation’s failure.

received afterwards seems completely
inappropriate.
A respected lawyer from
Windsor, Ontario, Bruce John
Stewart MacDonald had served as
a militia officer in the Essex Scottish
from 1929 to 1939, whereupon he
volunteered for overseas service. He
was a company commander and, after
Dieppe, second-in-command of the
battalion. During the reconstruction
and retraining of the unit he had
quickly developed a reputation as
an excellent trainer and leader; his
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men liked and respected him. In late
1942 he became chief instructor of the
4th Canadian Infantry Brigade Battle
School, coordinating training at 4th
Brigade HQ for company‑, battalion‑,
and brigade-sized exercises and
learning to command at senior levels.1
When MacDonald took command
in May 1943, Major Fred Tilston
(later recipient of the Victoria Cross)
commented in the battalion’s war
diary: “It is with great relief that
the command is to be passed to an
Essex Scot and to one such as Major
MacDonald, who is well qualified
to take over,…[with his] knowledge
of training methods and his varied
experience.”2
MacDonald appears in the unit’s
war diary much more frequently than
his predecessor, Lieutenant-Colonel
J.H. Mothersill. He organized both
battalion and brigade training and
increased parades and sub-unit
inspections to improve discipline and
pride of unit, which had faltered after
Dieppe. By mid-1943 retraining was
well under way.3
MacDonald “stressed the great
responsibility that every officer has
when he leads his men into battle.”4
He sought to ensure that all ranks
could command even without higher
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authority, having “each [platoon]
exercised in drill by the [officer], then
by several [private] soldiers.”5 When
the Essex Scots “boarded American
vessels for the journey to France” on
4 July 19446 they could reasonably
anticipate success in battle.
This article will examine the
planning for the assault at Verrières
Ridge, the attack itself, responses
to Brigadier Young’s report on the
event, and the conflicting sources that
make it difficult to understand what
really happened.

Planning the Assault

O

n the night of 19 July 1944, in
Operation Atlantic, the 2nd
Canadian Infantry Division received

8
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orders to carry 21 Army Group’s
advance southward from the southern
outskirts of Caen and to establish
itself on Verrières Ridge. The next
day 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade
moved forward with the Essex Scots
under command for an advance on
the ridge. The brigade commander
was Brigadier H.A. Young,“an RMC
graduate without previous combat
experience.”7 The crest of Verrières
runs roughly east-west and affords
a commanding view both north and
south. The German defenders could
see clearly the Anglo-Canadian
advance from the north. Tactically,
capture of the ridge was crucial
to II Canadian Corps’ southward
advance, as it would afford a view
south across nearby Roqancourt and

Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce MacDonald,
commander of the Essex Scottish Regiment
during the attack on Verrières Ridge, was
removed from his position because he was
seen as being nervous and not properly
able to control his battalion during the
battle.

almost to Falaise, where the British
army would eventually meet the
Americans in August.
Operation Goodwood, the major
British armoured attack to capture
Verrières Ridge, had failed. By 19
July VIII British Corps had lost about
270 tanks and many men and was
organizing its withdrawal. Although
Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds,
commander of II Canadian Corps,
assumed that these British attempts
had softened up German resistance,
the decision to attack the ridge with
a “fresh infantry division” proved
costly. 8 British pressure to break
the German line and Montgomery’s
insistence that the advance continue
forced Simonds’ hand.
The 6th Brigade plan of attack
involved four infantry battalions.
The Cameron Highlanders of Canada
would advance on the right flank
against St. André-sur-Orne, where
they would probably meet enemy
armour; the South Saskatchewan
Regiment would attack in the centre
towards the crest of the ridge; and
the Fusiliers de Mont-Royal (FMRs)
would advance on the left flank
towards Verrières, just below the
ridge’s summit.9 The Essex Scots were
to advance behind the South Sasks
and set up a firm base behind the
forward centre battalion and might
leapfrog the South Sasks if the latter
were able to consolidate on their
objectives.
“A” Squadron of the 27th
Canadian Armoured Regiment
(Sherbrooke Fusiliers) was to support
the attack on St. André-sur-Orne,
“C” Squadron was to support the
FMRs on the left, while “B” Squadron
remained in reserve at regimental
and brigade headquarters (HQ) near

2
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Ifs.10 “A” and “C” Squadrons were
to direct fire from rearward, hulldown positions to support the flanks
and deal with any enemy armour
that appeared; “B” would act at the
brigadier’s discretion. Artillery was
on call as needed. Sixth Brigade’s
orders termed the Sherbrookes “the
basis of [the] counter-attack force.”11
The decision to limit armoured
support in the centre would prove
disastrous.
HQs of both 2nd Division and
6th Brigade underestimated the
German forces facing the attackers.
According to 6th Brigade’s war
diary, the “presumption was that
the opposition on our front was not
great and that quick offensive action
should break through readily the
enemy screen.”12 Messages from 2nd
Division to 6th Brigade portray the
German 272nd Infantry Division,
which held the front along the line
Verrières–Fontenay-le-Marmion–St.
André-sur-Orne, as inferior to the 1st
and 12th SS Panzer Divisions, which
intelligence suggested the 272nd
had recently relieved on both sides
of the Orne.13 “As late as 14 July this
lower-grade [division] reported on
its way from the south of France.”14
The 272nd soon showed itself capable
of fierce fighting, and, as quickly
became clear, it had support from
armoured battlegroups of the 1st SS
and 2nd Panzer Divisions.15

Library and Archives Canada (LAC) PA 145590

Brigadier Hugh A. Young commanded the
6th Canadian Infantry Brigade during
the 20 July 1944 attack on Verrières
Ridge. Though he blamed the failure of
the operation on his subordinates, the
evidence makes it clear that he did not
have a solid grip on the battle.

The Attack on Verrières
Ridge, 20-21 July 1944

T

hat long 20 July began at 0115
hours when the Essex Scots, on
little sleep and no food, were ordered
to prepare to move. Their advance
began at 0800 hours, and, once they
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reached the 6th Brigade area, they
received “a poor breakfast and
little or no noon meal.”16 According
to 6th Brigade, they were not at
their forming-up point (FUP) until
1300 hours, two hours before the
attack.17 The regiment’s war diary
indicates arrival at the FUP and the
start of digging in at 1130 hours
and completion by 1300 hours; it
maintains that the enemy began
shelling the FUP at 1300 hours.
The artillery barrage began at
1435 hours and 25 minutes later the
three battalions of 6th Brigade crossed
the start-line.18 “It was a spectacular
sight seeing this advance over a front
of some 4000 yards.”19 All three units
reported “FOREST” as they reached
the intermediate report line. However,

the South Sasks were ambushed by
infantry of the German 272nd and
lost the barrage. The Germans had
cannily held fire for days, convincing
British army intelligence that this
sector was unoccupied. The South
Sasks attempted to sustain forward
momentum: “B Coy had pushed
through D Coy at the double to catch
up to our barrage…shortly after A
Coy on our left encountered the first
of many enemy posts.”20
Despite ferocious German
resistance, elements of the South
Sasks reached their objective. The
sources disagree, however, about
how quickly they reached their final
objective. The post-battle entry in 6th
Brigade’s war diary states that by
1700 hours the South Sasks reported
9
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two companies on their objective.21
According to the day’s operations
log, however, at 1650 hours the
Sasks were still 200 yards from the
objective, and “A” Company did
not radio success until 1725 hours.
At 1732 hours “D” Company also
reported success. The Camerons
sent back their codeword, MAPLE,
at 1650 hours. Sixth Brigade’s war
diary stated: “the situation on the
front of these two [battalions] was
very satisfactory, consequently at
about 1730 hours the Essex Scot were
ordered to move to their [position]
with all possible speed.”22
According to the log, the Essex
Scots were ordered forward at 1727
hours, a mere two minutes after the
South Sasks’ leading elements had
reported POPLAR and before their
“D” Company reached the objective.
Therefore the brigade war diary’s
account, with the South Sasks reaching
their objective and consolidating for a
half-hour,  allowing Brigadier Young
time to assess the situation before he
ordered the Essex forward, seems
erroneous. Young ordered the Essex
to advance only as the Sasks were
reaching their objective. The twominute interim did not permit proper
analysis of the situation. It appears
that brigade HQ could have known
only that the Sasks’ “A” Company
had arrived at the objective. Had
Young waited a half-hour he would
have seen the situation deteriorate:
18 minutes after the two forward
companies arrived 6th Brigade heard
from the Sasks only that “We are
being attacked by tanks.”23
The enemy “started to lay down
heavy mortar and artillery fire
accurately fired onto [the Sasks’]
positions.”24 At that point the first
enemy tanks appeared, knocking
out some of the battalion’s antitank guns and firing on the exposed
infantry. One Sask officer, Major
John Edmondson, commander of
“B” Company, recalled, “One tank
came right into my left forward
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platoon driving right over top of
people it didn’t shoot.” 25 As the
German counterattack intensified,
the Saskatchewan infantry went to
ground in the waist-high grass, which
hid it from the panzers, who could
now traverse the ridge at will and fire
on anything that moved. The enemy’s
continuing mortar fire inflicted further

casualties; acting CO Major G.R.
Matthews – already wounded and
furiously sending support requests
to brigade – and battalion Intelligence
Officer Lieutenant D.S. Pedlow both
“received an almost direct hit” in the
battalion HQ carrier vehicle, which
also knocked out communications.26
The beginning of a heavy rainstorm
further complicated communication
and observation, but consolidation
continued. “The 6-pounders, mortars,
carrier and pioneer platoons were
ordered forward to help prepare
a battalion ‘fortress’ but these also
came under attack from infantry and
armour appearing over the ridge
from the southwest at 1750 hours.”27
The battalion war diary reported that
“The tanks attacked “D” Company
with HE [high explosive] and MG
[machine gun] fire.”28 Then an enemy
counterattack from the southeast
overran “B” Company and destroyed
the remaining anti-tank guns that
were moving to their consolidation
positions. “The tanks came right up
to the crest of the hill and started
to lay down [heavy] HE and MG

fire causing heavy casualties.” 29
In the face of such overwhelming
firepower, some officers ordered the
exposed infantry to withdraw to the
cover of the waist-high grain. Then
“the tanks, once they had no easy
targets, sprayed the wheat fields with
machine gun fire and turned circles
through the wheat in an effort to
crush the men or flush them into the
open so they could be fired upon.”30
According to 6th Brigade’s
operations log, the South Sasks
urgently requested assistance at 1750
hours and again five minutes later:
“We are being attacked by tanks.
We need help from the tank counter
attack coming from the SOUTH.”31
This was the last message received
from the beleaguered battalion for
the next two hours, presumably
because of the destruction of the HQ
carrier vehicle, along with the loss
of the acting CO. When the Sasks
finally were in touch again, they
reported enemy shelling and further
casualties.32 Requests for assistance
started arriving 23 minutes after the
lead South Sask elements reached the
objective, but before the Essex had
reached its consolidation position.
The Essex’s orders entailed forming
a firm base for the South Sasks, which
necessitated time to create a firm base
before the Germans counterattacked
the Sasks and forced them back.
The Essex Scots started moving at
1727 hours. They reported reaching
their objective and starting to dig in at
1820 hours, a half-hour after the start
of the German counterattack which
had decimated the Sasks in plain sight,
just several hundred yards forward.33
During the counterattack, one of the
Sasks’ two surviving senior officers,
Major L.L. Dickin, went back to inform
Essex CO MacDonald that the Sasks
could not survive on the objective
they had so recently occupied. As
a result, they would retire behind
the forward Essex positions which
were not yet fully consolidated.
Dickin and Edmondson then went
11
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The remainder of “B” [Company]
then withdrew through the grain field
through “C” [Company] area. Major
J.S. Edmondson then reported the
[position] of the line of the forward
troops to [Brigade Command Post]
at Ifs. The Essex Scottish who were
in reserve, then came forward and
started to dig in…the remainder of
the S Sask R then withdrew through
the Essex Scottish, with the exception
of some of the boys.35

Even though many South Sasks
remained with the Essex Scots to help
mount a defence large numbers of
Sasks continued to withdraw directly
through the Essex positions.
The forward Essex companies,
now struck by tanks and artillery,
began to withdraw. Verbal reports
began to come in that elements
of “A” and “B” Companies were
coming back.36 The Essex reported
to 6th Brigade: “[Tanks] south of the
[crossroads].”37 Then, more ominous,
“There are two tanks in front of our
“D” [Company], We need [antitank support] immediately.”38 “D”
Company was one of the reserve
Essex companies, and this message
suggests that the forward companies
had already been turned back and
urgently needed artillery, armour,
or anti-tank weapons. What could
the unsupported and exposed South
Sasks and Essex Scots do against
strongly-entrenched enemy troops,
panzers and a constant shower of
mortar and artillery shells?
The tanks of the Sherbrooke
Fusiliers’ “A” and “C” Squadrons did
little to address the centre battalions’
predicament. “C” Squadron reported
efforts to reach a good firing position
near Beauvoir Farm, but “things
became too hot,” so it withdrew.39
Sergeant Olivier of “C” Squadron, in
a Firefly tank, maintained that as he
took up a position on the high ground
overlooking St. André in support
of the Camerons he observed three
panzers near Verrières village and
fired on them. The rain and smoke
prevented him from seeing whether
he scored any hits. He did notice the
Panzers returning fire, so he moved
his tank behind a hill under cover
of smoke.40 His fire appears to be
one of the few significant instances

LAC PA 131378

company commanders’ decision to
withdraw doubtless saved lives.
According to the South Sasks’ war
diary and 6th Brigade’s operations
log, the battalion’s companies were
in retreat before the Essex Scots had
reached their objective:

LAC PA 131373

to inform Young of the situation
in hopes of receiving armoured or
artillery support. Underestimating
the opposition, Young gave orders
to hold the position on the slopes of
the ridge and offered no armoured
support.
Returning to the unit, Dickin
and Edmondson found remnants
of the South Sasks withdrawing
through the Essex forward positions
back to their FUP.34 Some stayed on
the slopes to assist the Essex Scots,
but the unopposed Panzers again
pinned them to the ground. Many
of the Sasks who had fallen back
were wounded or withdrawing to
more defensible positions. Staying
up front would almost certainly
have spelled annihilation, and the

Sherman tanks of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers
were positioned behind Verrières Ridge
but Brigadier Young never gave the order
to commit them to battle.
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Canadian infantry on the move south of Caen.

of support near the centre all day.
Although 6th Brigade’s pre-attack
plan designated “B” Squadron as a
counterattack force, no such move
ever occurred, or was ordered. The
reserve squadron moved out only to
reinforce success on the right, behind
the Camerons.
Meanwhile, back on the ridge, the
Essex’s “A” and “B” Companies had
begun to withdraw, not necessarily
out of control as Brigadier Young
and some historians have since
suggested. According to MacDonald
and Captain D.W. McIntyre (“B”
Company commander), the men had
been unable to consolidate because
they had been ordered forward
during a counterattack and the
enemy had directed all kinds of fire
on them. McIntyre consulted with the
“A” Company commander and they
jointly decided to withdraw, chiefly
because they were being attacked by
mortar, machine gun and tank fire,
and had lost communication with
battalion HQ.
Edmondson perhaps observed
this party as he set off to report to
Young:
When we set off, I noticed small
figures far down the slope in front

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2009

of the St. André crossroads stand up
and converge for a moment as if to
consult and then double to the rear.
Some of the forward elements of the
Essex Scottish were withdrawing.
To me they were in a precarious
position and had to seek cover from
the intense enemy fire.41

MacDonald ordered McIntyre
to gather up his men and dig them
in behind “D” Company. Only a
portion of “B” Company dug in. The
rest of “B” had, on McIntyre’s orders,
returned to the FUP to evacuate
casualties. That these men later
appeared in the rear does not prove
that “B” Company retreated in
panic.42 “The B Company withdrawal
appears to have been well handled and
controlled otherwise.”43 MacDonald
later admitted, however, that “A”
Company, having lost all of its
officers and most non-commissioned
officers (NCOs), retreated in some
disorder. Clearly only parts of the
Essex forward companies actually
“broke” and “collapsed,” while the
remainder withdrew in an orderly
and controlled manner.
MacDonald attempted to keep
control of his battalion by ordering
the lead (now retreating) companies

to halt and dig in behind the reserve
Essex companies, which then became
the forward units. At 2000 hours he
toured these companies and tried to
settle his justifiably unnerved men.
The CO claims that he,
talked to nearly every man. I satisfied
myself with the positions held, the
forward ones…I told the men they
were now the forward companies
and must hold on at all cost. Some
were shaken a bit by the S Sask R
and A and B Coy withdrawals, but
seemed reassured and steadied by
my visit.”44

As MacDonald ordered, these two
companies held their ground just
short of their assigned objective.
They did not allow further enemy
penetration that night, despite
constant shelling.
MacDonald returned to the FUP
near Ifs to see if he could arrange
food and hot drinks for his men in
the forward areas and to find the
men from “A” and “B” who had
withdrawn. While en route he learned
from Young that 100 Essex Scots were
at the FUP. MacDonald was surprised
at that number but he understood
that “A” and “B” Companies had
13
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suffered many casualties and that
McIntyre had detailed about 30
men to evacuate the wounded.
Presumably many of those in the rear
were walking wounded and so might
appear to Young to be improperly out
of battle.
MacDonald found about 50 men
at the FUP.45 Sometime after 2100
hours, according to MacIntyre, “The
C.O.…ordered me to get in his carrier
and go to the rear and pick up my
thirty men who had been evacuating
casualties and collect the remnants of
“A” Company who had previously
been withdrawn and were without
an officer.”46
At the FUP, MacDonald marched
the men he found to brigade HQ
to refit them for battle and supply
ammunition. According to him,
brigade was unable to replenish the
men, so he ordered them to stay in
the rear, have a good meal and a
decent night’s sleep, and be ready to
return to the line in the morning, once

brigade HQ had ammunition. Young
appears to have again encountered
these men and went to division to
acquire ammunition and weapons for
them. The men received new supplies
at 0400 hours, complete with orders
from both MacDonald and Young
to return to the line. Lieutenant A.
McCrimmon, previously left out
of battle, led about 14 men to the
front at 0300 hours, reorganized “A”
Company, and took command.47
Meanwhile, the Essex forward
companies spent the night in their
wet slit trenches and kept watch on
the blood-soaked slopes in front of
them. During the night rain, mud,
and non-stop mortaring had made
many weapons unusable. “The
men worked continuously on their
[weapons], even tearing off their
shirts for rags in a futile attempt to
keep them in order.”48
At first light, eight enemy tanks
were loitering around “C” Company’s
area, with infantry and snipers in

tow.49 German tanks and infantry
maintained constant machine gun and
small arms fire. MacDonald returned
to Ifs, as he had received orders at
0930 hours to meet with the brigadier
and apparently intended to request
armoured support. When he arrived
Young was absent, so he decided
to acquire such support by himself.
The tanks in “C” Company’s area,
he reported, “were so positioned that
our [anti-tank] guns and PIATs could
not get at them. There were many of
our own tanks in the vicinity, but
they did not appear to be taking any
action. I asked one tank commander
personally for help, but he flatly
refused.”50
Back in “C” Company’s sector, the
enemy had moved into position in the
dark for an armoured counterattack
on the morning of 21 July. The
reinforced enemy again struck at
the weakest point in the line, the
6th Brigade’s shaken centre held by
the harried Essex Scots. The enemy

Knocked out tanks remain on Verrières
Ridge after the battle. The open nature
of the terrain is apparent from this
photograph.
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tanks started harassing the forward
troops at about 0900 hours, and the
attack continued throughout the
morning as more enemy troops and
tanks arrived. The barrage cut off
“C” Company, No.17 Platoon and
battalion HQ from the rest of the
unit. Many men were captured, with
the Germans marching them into
captivity.51
Some men started withdrawing
in the face of the continued German
attacks. Further, those from “A”
and “B” Companies with orders to
return to the front remained at the
FUP. Young ordered MacDonald
to intercept the men who were
coming out and re-form them on
an intermediate position. At about
1100 hours he also told MacDonald
to take the men from “A” and “B”
Companies with him to start digging
in on the intermediate position,
which surprised MacDonald, who
had thought these men already at the
front, as per his orders. Although some
Essex Scots were moving rearward
as a result of the German pressure,
“elements of two [companies] were
still in the forward area,”52 and the
battalion continued to hold the line.
As ordered, the Essex CO formed
the battalion on the intermediate
position and passed word through
to the forward companies to
withdraw to that point. The German
counterattack, along with the Essex
withdrawal, created a salient between
the Camerons on the right and the
FMRs on the left. The Essex held its
new position and received orders
to secure and prepare a start-line
for the Black Watch, which was to
attack through the Essex in order to
reoccupy the forward positions that
the Essex had occupied the previous
night. At 1800 hours the Black Watch
counterattacked the Germans (this
time with armoured support) and
recaptured the “lost” ground, thereby
stabilizing the front. The Essex
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remained in its intermediate position
until 2200 hours, when it was relieved
by the Royal Regiment of Canada.

Responses to Young’s Report

B

rigadier Young’s report on the
operation blamed the retreat
and casualties on Lieutenant-Colonel
MacDonald’s failure to control his
men, his nervousness and seeming
breakdown, his unsuitability for
command, and the men’s resulting
lack of confidence in him. But Young
himself acted questionably during
and especially after the battle. His
attack plan was flawed, and the
battalion COs knew it. However,
Foulkes and Simonds agreed with
Young’s conclusions and relieved
MacDonald of command.
MacDonald very strongly
protested the adverse report and
cited five reasons why the attack
failed. First, there was a lack of
communication from the outset,
unexpected and overpowering
enemy action and bad weather.
Second, both the South Sasks and
the two forward Essex companies
had to withdraw in the face of heavy
enemy armoured counterattacks.
Third, these enemy assaults caused
many casualties. Fourth, according to
MacDonald, a series of contradictory
orders from Young made absolute
compliance next to impossible. Fifth,
the brigadier refused to permit the
men from “A” and “B” Companies
whom he found at his command
post to return to battle, despite
MacDonald’s orders.53
Following his dismissal,
MacDonald asked his company
commanders to determine whether
the other ranks indeed lacked
confidence in him. The entire battalion,
apparently without his urging, signed
a petition in support of him.54 Many
of the men approached him and
reassured him of their continuing

confidence and stated “their feeling
that I have been unjustly punished for
something I could not help.”55
The Essex war diarist, Fred
Tilston, had written on 22 July:
It is not a pleasant picture to realize
that so many of the [battalion]
have been lost, especially when the
action was not successful and many
of the casualties could have been
avoided by better planning and the
observance of the procedure that our
[training] had led us to believe would
be followed before going into battle.
All of the rules of man management
were either violated or ignored, by
the sudden move ordered after midnight, the loss of sleep by all ranks, a
poor breakfast and little or no noon
meal before battle, and the general or
detailed picture and plan, if known,
was not given to the junior [officers]
or troops.56

Higher command, of course, had
ordered the untimely moves, botched
“man management,” and failed to pass
on crucial intelligence. MacDonald
commented that “psychologically
everything was wrong and as far
from what might have been imagined
as the proper preparation for their
first battle.”57
MacDonald had little faith in
Young’s plan: “insofar as inspiring
confidence is concerned I must
admit that I lacked confidence in
the [brigadier’s] plan, which did fail
to a large extent.”58 Officers of the
South Sasks echoed MacDonald’s
misgivings. Lieutenant-Colonel Clift,
temporarily replacing Brigadier Lett
of 4th Brigade, stressed the need for
armoured support. “I had asked,
and was granted, a tank squadron
in direct support, because of the
long assault, the rising ground at
the objective, and the chances of a
quick tank cum infantry attack by
the enemy.”59 However, on 19 July,

15
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the acting CO, Major Matthews,
had informed his officers that there
would be no supporting armour.
“The only support we could count
on was indirect support of the
Armour.”60 Young’s removal of tanks
was confirmed in 6th Brigade’s final
orders.61
Young had accused MacDonald
of being nervous and uncontrolled.
MacDonald claims that after arriving
at brigade HQ as summoned at 0930
hours, he awaited the brigadier until
1100 hours. During this time, the
Essex Scots were under attack and
needed their CO, yet he waited for
Young to return. MacDonald had:
no food for a day and a half,
practically no sleep for two nights
and had been soaked to the skin with
water and mud for 5 or 6 hrs, and
was consequently thoroughly chilled
and cold. I was indignant at the
lack of tank support, the casualties
from artillery fire, the lack of food
and drink, the men from A and B
coys who still had not reported,
and concerned about the fighting
condition of our weapons. I felt that
unless something could be done, we
would have difficulty in resisting
any determined counterattack…
[Brigadier Young] was apparently
not suffering from any of these
physical discomforts or worries and
was very composed. He refused to
see that anything was wrong, or that
I had any basis for my complaint

MacDonald doubtless appeared
anxious and annoyed, but he and
the South Sask officers had good
reason to be so. Every one of the
commanding officers who went
to see Young for help was excited,
which the inexperienced brigadier
interpreted as nervousness and
hysteria, instead of a reasonable
reaction to a desperate situation. In
his post-battle letters to Foulkes and
Simonds, MacDonald states that
Young was unduly impatient with
him. John Edmondson, acting CO
of the South Sasks, also recounted
the brigadier’s impatience and
annoyance. The South Sask major
describes brigade HQ that day as
“in a state of confusion because they
didn’t know what was going on.
They seemed to change their mind
from moment to moment.… the
Brigade Commander offered no help
to alleviate the immediate desperate
situation.”63 Later, when LieutenantColonel Gauvreau of the FMRs
arrived to report the situation on the
left flank, Young remarked that he was
“somewhat excited.”64 It is clear that
Young was unduly impatient with
his battalion commanders in that he
told Edmondson to calm down, and
then accused MacDonald of losing
control, subsequently claiming that
he was not fit to command. However,
the tactical shortcomings exposed in
this attack were not MacDonald’s or
Edmondson’s, but Young’s.

and misgivings respecting support.

Conflicting Sources

It seemed sufficient to him that we
had an armoured regiment standing
around in the hills, whether they did
anything to help us or not, while the
Panthers harassed us at will with
88mm and MMG fire, and obviously
intended to support an attack on
our position…My feelings were
less nervous than frustration and
suppressed anger at his impatient
attitude toward me and my inability
to move him.62
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O

perations logs, war diaries, and
a formal inquiry offer a wealth
of conflicting information about
the assault on Verrières Ridge. The
operations logs recorded events as
they happened, the war diarist wrote
his piece after the battle, and the Court
of Enquiry in the Field gathered
verbal testimony under oath. C.P.
Stacey ranks the operations log as the
most reliable source by far:

Here the historian has before him
the record of information received
and sent out, of orders given and
received. Every entry is timed. The
record is strictly contemporary; it
is almost wholly impersonal; and
it is maintained, not for historical
purposes, as the unit or formation
war diary is, but as an instrument for
fighting the battle…If a division’s log
is available, you can write the history
of that division’s part in the fight
with confidence; if it is missing, you
are hamstrung.65

Y ou n g u n dou b t e dl y r ea d a n d
approved the brigade war diary
prior to its filing and even added
some sections himself, yet it does
not correspond with other evidence.
The war diary maintains that, as a
result of the South Sasks’ second call
for help, the reserve squadron of the
Sherbrooke Fusiliers, as well as an
additional troop from “A” Squadron
near St. André, was “ordered across”
to help the Sasks. 66 However, the
Sherbrooke Fusiliers’ war diary
and the ops log make no mention
of any such orders. Additionally,
Sherbrooke after-action reports never
mention moving out in support of
the centre; certainly the South Sasks
and the Essex Scots never saw tanks
in close support. Furthermore, there
are numerous timing inconsistencies
between the 6th Brigade’s operations
log and its war diary. The war diary
paints an orderly picture of the
advance in which brigade HQ took
a half-hour to assess the situation
before committing the Essex Scots.
According to the log, however,
brigade could have had no more than
three minutes to decide.
Young wrote in the war diary,
“the chief difficulty experienced by all
four [battalions] was the devastating
mortar and [artillery] fire which
descended upon them immediately
they reached their objectives.”67 While
artillery and mortar fire inflicted
numerous casualties, infantry of both

10

the South Sasks and the Essex Scots
had to withdraw chiefly because,
once they had lost their anti-tank
weapons, they could not deal with
the attacking enemy tanks. In the
ops log almost every request for
assistance mentions the presence of
German armour.
Testimony gathered during
the inquiry suggests that enemy
armour was the prime reason for
difficulty. 68 Numerous witnesses
stated, and the court concluded,
that enemy armour caused many
losses. Company Sergeant-Major W.J.
Foster of “C” Company of the Essex
Scots testified, “During the hours of
darkness 8 Tiger Tanks moved into
the rear of our position with 4 on our
right flank. These tanks continually
harassed our position.”69 According
to D.W. MacIntyre, commander
of “B” Company, “at 1800 hours
20 July 44 my company occupied
a forward position in support of
the South Sask Regt. On our left I
observed a number of Tiger tanks
after they had been firing at us for
some time.” He added, “At 1930
hours I started to withdraw…a
number of my men had to carry
wounded which meant other men
had to carry two or more weapons…I
know all my weapons that were
missing were, with the exception of
one P.I.A.T., destroyed as a result of
enemy action.”70 Clearly the forward
units “did not drop their weapons
and run.”71 Major T.E. Steele, “D”
Company Commander testified that
in the morning, “I observed 7 enemy
tanks to my rear right. I suspected
these tanks to be there during the
night as we had been heavily fired
upon…at approximately 1555 hours
we were heavily counterattacked…”72
Acting Company Sergeant-Major R.R.
Case, commanding the Essex Carrier
Platoon, testified that, “my own
carrier was completely destroyed by
an 88mm shell (the Tiger tank’s main
armament).”73 Company SergeantMajor J.W. Coldwell of the South
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Major Fred Tilston, who would later be awarded the Victoria Cross for
his actions in the Rhineland, spoke for the Regiment when he wrote
in the Essex Scots’ war diary after the battle:
It is not a pleasant picture to realize that so many of the
[battalion] have been lost, especially when the action was
not successful and many of the casualties could have
been avoided by better planning…All of the rules of man
management were either violated or ignored,…and plan, if
known, was not given to the junior [officers] or troops.
This, of course, was an indictment of Young and support for
MacDonald.

Sasks’ “A” Company testified that
they were “prevented from digging
in by enemy fire and six tanks.”74
Captain G.E. Colgate, in command of
the South Sasks’ Anti-Tank Platoon,
testified, “Some of the guns were still
moving into position when they were
fired upon by enemy tanks. They
tried to return fire but in doing so
we lost 4 T.16 Carriers through tank
fire.”75 Lieutenant S.M. Carter states,
“We had been digging in for about 15
minutes when we were attacked by
about half a dozen tanks… I saw the

tanks overrun “B” Company… (who)
started to infiltrate back through
us and then they were shelled by
German 88mms… The two forward
platoons in my company were overrun by tanks.”76
Regarding any material
deficiencies, the court ruled “that the
deficiencies were caused by enemy
action and could not have been
avoided. There is no suggestion in
the evidence that arms or equipment
was deliberately discarded or
thrown away, or that the unit or any
17
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individual was neglectful and on the
contrary it would appear that care
had been taken that this should not
happen.77
The court was slightly more
critical of the South Sasks: “the
excessive loss of stores was largely
due to the manner in which the
withdrawal was carried out. Whether
or not the unit withdrew at too early a
stage, is not a matter for this court to
decide.” The court added, “The losses
were partly due to the counter-attack
by tanks. The anti-tank guns all being
destroyed before they even got into
position, left the unit with PIATs only
as anti-tank weapons. There was no
armour support for the infantry.”78
Even so, the brigade war diary
claims that when Edmondson visited
the brigadier at 1900 hours Young
told him, “orders would be issued
to the armour to cover him with
protective fire.”79 Edmondson denied
receiving any such assurance or
support, and no such assistance ever
materialized.
Young also denied that
MacDonald tried to reorganize the
men of “A” and “B” Companies
and further claimed that he himself
made good ammunition and weapon
deficiencies with 2nd Division. As we
have seen, however, MacDonald tried
to re-equip his men, but brigade was
unable to accommodate his request.
The war diary claims that the brigade
commander’s “orders were made very
clear to [MacDonald] but he seemed
to have lost complete control.” 80
However, MacDonald contended that
the orders were not clear to him and
were contradictory:
i)

That I should continue to hold

my [forward position].
ii)

That I should organize an

intermediate position with these
remnants of A and B Coys.
iii) That I could withdraw my
[forward troops] to the intermediate
position for reorganization and
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later reoccupation of the forward
position.
iv) That I must not withdraw
the [forward troops], but should
continue to hold the intermediate
position.
v)

That I should hold the

intermediate position and so
secure the [start-line] for the RHC
attack at 1800 hours.81

Sixth Brigade’s war diary further
contends that at the end of 20 July,
the Essex Scots were “in the process
of being reformed to their original
objective.”82 This statement implies
that the Essex was not on its objective
and that it needed re-forming. Neither
implication is entirely accurate. The
Essex Scots’ forward companies were
where the brigadier ordered them to
be, and they held the line all night
long.

Conclusion

I

t is not difficult to understand
why Young filed an adverse
report against MacDonald. It was
easier for him to claim that this
battalion commander failed, not he
himself. Reg Matthews, the South
Sasks’ acting CO, had been killed
in action. The writer of the entry
in 6th Brigade’s war diary refers to
MacDonald’s excited state but wrote
after it was clear that the battle was
a failure. Any such references do not
appear in the ops log or in the words
of MacDonald’s men. Edmondson’s
account of the confusion at 6th
Brigade HQ suggests little to
commend in its actions and decisions.
The brigade’s war diary repeatedly
refers to the South Sasks’ retreat as
a “withdrawal to reorganize,” but
implies that the Essex withdrawal
was “out of control,” since “patrols
were established to stop any further
rearward movement of the Essex
Scots,” the only non-6th Brigade

battalion attacking that day.83 Such
a contention would sustain Young’s
complaint that MacDonald had lost
control.
MacDonald acknowledged that
the Black Watch had regained the
so-called lost ground that evening.
But he pointed out that the Black
Watch did not secure any ground
that the Essex had not already held
the previous night. MacDonald
claimed that had brigade offered
any significant support, such as
aggressive tank action, artillery fire,
or a proper resupply, his unit could
have held its forward positions as
long as necessary. He added,“The
area eventually reoccupied by the
RHC was only that part of the front
finally held by the Essex Scottish
prior to the final withdrawal, and this
reoccupation was accomplished with
all the real artillery and close tank
support which was denied to us.”84
So the question remains: why
did the Essex suffer a defeat that
day? This article has outlined two
possible reasons. First, as Brigadier
Young claimed, Lieutenant-Colonel
MacDonald had lost control of his
battalion and become too nervous
to exercise proper command and
control. Or, second, failure was the
result of a series of unavoidable
circumstances, unattributable to
one man alone. These include the
confusion of battle; the dislocation
caused by the withdrawal of the
South Sasks directly through the
Essex’s consolidation area; the
subsequent retreat of its own forward
companies; and the lack of effective
communication both to lower-level
commanders and to brigade, coupled
with incessant and well-supported
enemy infantry and tank attacks.
These factors combined to make
exercise of command and control
impossible for MacDonald who
nevertheless continued to issue
orders and attempted to resupply and
reorganize his men as per orders from
brigade HQ.
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Brigade HQ’s failure to provide
armoured support was compounded
by deteriorating weather, which
halted the planned artillery and
aerial support, and the early loss of
the infantry’s anti-tank weapons.
Enemy infiltration into the forward
positions also precluded substantial
artillery assistance, which would
have caused as many friendly as
German casualties. The provision of
adequate armoured support, which
MacDonald repeatedly requested
and which, by his account, met with
Young’s incredulity and annoyance,
would most likely have reduced
Essex casualties and greatly increased
chances of success. One need look
no further than the Black Watch,
which launched its attack shortly
after the Essex pulled out, with
support from “the tanks of the 6th
and 27th Armoured Regiments, and a
formidable artillery programme.”85
Most of the evidence suggests
that Lieutenant-Colonel MacDonald
could have done little more than he did
to maintain control and to recapture
any lost ground. All indications
suggest that Young, through his plan
of attack and especially through his
mismanagement of both infantry
and armour, bears the greater share
of responsibility for the operation’s
failure. He was, therefore, careful in
post-operation documents to infer
that enemy artillery and mortar fire
and MacDonald were the problems,
not enemy armour. The Essex Scottish
Regiment suffered a defeat on the
slopes of Verrières Ridge because of
inadequate support from Brigadier
Young and the headquarters of the
6th Canadian Infantry Brigade.
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Soldiers of the 58th Battalion on their way to the trenches, June 1917.
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